Spain - Decline Essays - Philippine Dynasty, Knights Of Santiago

Spain - Decline OUTLINE THE FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO A DECLINE IN SPANISH POWER BY THE MIDDLE OF THE 17TH CENTURY The general perception of the historical world is that Spain, once a powerful nation, declined from its period of grace around the commencement of the seventeenth century. However, more recently a number of historians have come to refute such a claim. One of the leading figures in the study of this period is Henry Kamen who argues that no such decline occurred at all. Contemporary historians, for example Gonzalez de Cellorigo, often believed the opposite, in that Spain was indeed suffering a decline in status which may have been the result of such characters not wishing to face the possibility that Spain never enjoyed hegemony at all. Kamens main area of dispute is that he believes there to have been no economic decline at all, whilst still agreeing that there was indeed a political decline, he states we cannot question the obvious fact that there was a decline in imperial and military power, the likes of which can be backed up by the events in 1637 and 1643 the battles of the Downs and Rocroi respectively. His argument is that for Spain to suffer an economic decline they must have been financially strong in the first place, thus providing the platform from which to fall. Jeronimo Fernandez de Mata claimed it is said that when empires reach their peak, they begin to decline. Indeed this is correct but peaks can only be highlighted when examining events in hindsight and contemporaries would have been blissfully unaware of such a downfall. Kamens ideas can certainly be supported by little more than common historical knowledge. Even as early as the reign of Philip II, Spain experienced frequent bankruptcies mainly due to multiple foreign wars which could be supported by income from taxation and a monopoly on trade from the Indies alone. In conclusion Kamen believes that Spain was simply incapable of economic decline because Spain never rose. He also claims that no real timing can be identified for the precise moments of decline, a point refuted by Professor Israe l. Israel claims that the majority of belief is now pointed towards a decline beginning in the early years of the reign of Philip III and ending in the mid-seventeenth century. The key obstacle that barred Spains path in the eyes of Israel, is that of unavoidable natural disasters such as plague and famine, the latter of which can be partly blamed on the financial crisis itself as well as poor agriculture. In a period of approximately twenty-five years at the start of the seventeenth century, the population of Spain fell by over one and a half million. Such adversities counter-balanced against efforts to improve Spanish finance in the sixteenth century through industrial growth, particularly in textiles. However, before Kamens theories began to cause disagreement, historians of the early to middle twentieth century had moulded the foundations for his hypothesis. Historians such as Ranke and Hume pointed out that the ignorance and foolhardy toils of the leaders of Spain themselves had brought decadence onto their empire. With the advent of Earl Hamiltons article in 1938, the economic dimension was introduced, but it was not until Professor Elliott published his article in 1961 that each idea began to materialise together. Until now the idea of a general decline had been accepted but now Elliott had highlighted the difference between a political and economic fall, which could only lead on to each other and not occur simultaneously. Whilst agreeing that international trade difficulties were indeed partly responsible he made it clear that internal problems were the key to Spanish failure. Similarities can easily be drawn with Professor Israels theorem, particularly regarding the importan ce of agricultural and demographic crisis in the eventuality of the decline itself. It was made clear that the economic decline, occuring at the turn of the sixteenth century, came before the political fall, which he pinpoints to 1640. It is such evaluation which conflicts with Kamen, who must surely agree that in the second half of the sixteenth century Spain was undoubtedly the most powerful nation in Europe. If this is so then the fact that this hegemony